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Randomized controlled trials are increasingly used to evaluate policies. How can we make these experiments
as useful as possible for policy purposes? We argue greater use should be made of experiments that
identify behavioral mechanisms that are central to clearly specified policy questions, what we call
“mechanism experiments.” These types of experiments can be of great policy value even if the intervention
that is tested (or its setting) does not correspond exactly to any realistic policy option.
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Randomized controlled trials are increasingly used to evaluate policies. To cite 
one example, in 2002, the U.S. Department of Education founded the Institute of 
Education Sciences with a primary focus on running experiments; its annual budget is 
now about $700 million (U.S. Department of Education, 2010). This trend has been 
spurred in part by numerous independent groups—the Coalition for Evidence-Based 
Policy, the Campbell Collaboration, an international network of researchers hosted by the 
Norwegian Knowledge Centre for the Health Services, the Poverty Action Lab, and 
Innovations for Poverty Action—that promote policy experimentation. Others however 
question the wisdom of this trend. A vigorous debate has arisen around the value of 
experimental methods for informing policy (e.g., Angrist and Pischke, 2009, 2010; 
Banerjee and Duflo, 2009; Deaton 2010; Heckman, 2010; Imbens, 2010). We argue this 
debate has often been framed too narrowly on experimental versus non-experimental 
methods. An important distinction between experimental methods has been overlooked. 
Suppose a policy maker has already decided on using an experiment. She faces a 
design problem. Given a fixed budget, how should she design her experiment to 
maximize policy-relevant information? The answer seems obvious: replicate the policy as 
it would be implemented at scale, and randomly assign units (people or sites of the sort 
that would be targeted by the policy) to treatment and control conditions. The design 
challenges involve selecting the most cost effective units of randomization and the data 
collection strategies. We call the resulting experiments policy evaluations. In practice 





relevant) situations, these are not the best experiments to use—even if the sole goal is to 
help inform policy decisions. 
A simple example illustrates our point. Suppose the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) wanted to help local police chiefs decide whether to implement “broken windows” 
policing, which is based on the theory that police should pay more attention to enforcing 
minor crimes like graffiti or vandalism because they can serve as a “signal that no one 
cares” and thereby accelerate more serious forms of criminal behavior (Kelling and 
Wilson 1982, p. 31). Suppose that there is no credibly exogenous source of variation in 
the implementation or intensity of broken windows policing across areas, which rules out 
the opportunity for a low-cost study of an existing “natural experiment” (Meyer, 1995, 
Angrist and Pischke, 2009). To an experimentally-minded economist, the most obvious 
next step goes something like: DOJ should choose a representative sample of cities, 
randomly select half of their high-crime areas to receive broken windows policing (or 
perhaps randomly assign half the cities to get citywide broken windows policing), and 
carry out a traditional policy evaluation. 
Now consider an alternative experiment: Buy a small fleet of used cars. Break the 
windows of half of them. Park the cars in a randomly selected subset of neighborhoods, 
and then measure whether more serious crimes increase in response. What might seem 
like a fanciful example is actually the basic research design used in the 1960s study by 
Stanford psychologist Philip Zimbardo that helped motivate the broken windows theory 
(Kelling and Wilson, 1982, p. 31),
1 which in turn led to the implementation of broken 
windows policing at scale in New York City during the 1990s. One can of course perform 
                                                 






variants with other small crimes; for example, one could hire young men to wear the 
standard-issue uniform for drug distribution (plain white t-shirt, baggy jeans, Timberland 
boots) and have them loiter at randomly selected street corners. This mechanism 
experiment does not test a policy: it directly tests the causal mechanism that underlies the 
broken windows policy. 
Which experiment would be more useful for public policy? Partly it’s an issue of 
staging. Suppose the mechanism experiment failed to find the causal mechanism 
operative. Would we even need to run a policy evaluation? If (and this is the key 
assumption) the mechanism experiment weakened policy makers’ belief in broken 
windows policing, then we can stop. Running the (far cheaper) mechanism experiment 
first serves as a valuable screen. Conversely, if the mechanism experiment found very 
strong effects, we might now run a policy evaluation to calibrate magnitudes. Or, 
depending on the costs of the policy evaluation, the magnitudes found in the mechanism 
experiment, and what else we think we already know about the policing and crime 
“production functions,” we may even choose to adopt the policy straightaway. 
Mechanism experiments more carefully incorporate prior knowledge and can be 
designed to maximize information in the places where the policy maker needs to know 
the most. In our broken windows example, suppose there is general agreement about the 
list of minor offenses that might plausibly accelerate more serious crimes (that is, the list 
of candidate mediating mechanisms M in Figure 1). Suppose (from previous work) we 
also know the elasticity of minor offenses with respect to policing (P→M in Figure 1). 
What policymakers do not know is the accelerator: by how much will reducing minor 





parameter about which there is the greatest uncertainty or disagreement (M→Y in Figure 
1). In contrast, a policy evaluation that measures the policy’s impact on serious crimes, 
P→Y, also provides information about the crime accelerator, but with more noise 
because it combines the variability in crime outcomes with the variability in the impact of 
policing on minor crimes in any given city / year combination. With enough sample (that 
is, money), one could recover the (M→Y) link. In a world of limited resources, 
mechanism experiments concentrate resources on estimating the parameters that are most 
decision relevant.  
We argue that mechanism experiments should play a more central role in the 
policy process. The broken windows example is not an isolated case: many policies have 
theories built into them, even if they are sometimes just implicit. Often these theories can 
be tested more cost effectively and precisely with experiments that do not mimic real (or 
even feasible) policies. Our argument runs counter to the critique leveled by some 
economists against the large-scale government social experiments of the 1970s and 1980s 
for “not necessarily test[ing] real policy options” (Harris, 1985, p. 161). We argue that 
some of these experiments, because they highlight mechanisms, could have far-reaching 
policy value. Social scientists already value mechanism experiments because they 
contribute to building knowledge. Our argument is that even if the sole goal were 
informing policy, mechanism experiments play a crucial, under-appreciated role. 
This distinction between mechanism experiments and “policy evaluations could 
also change the debate between about the use of experimentation to guide policy. We feel 
many of the criticisms of experimentation are really criticisms of policy evaluations—





policy may affect outcomes are numerous or unclear. Deaton (2010, p. 246) for example 
fears experimentation generates information that is too “narrow and local” to be of much 
use for policy. While this can also be true for mechanism experiments, because of their 
emphasis on how programs work, the knowledge gained can extend to a broader range of 
situations. 
The next section of the paper provides a brief review of how economists have 
thought about experimentation and the problem of forecasting the effects of different 
types of policies in different settings – that is, the challenge of external validity. We then 
discuss what mechanism experiments can teach us. We use the randomized Moving to 
Opportunity (MTO) residential mobility experiment (and several hypothetical extensions) 
as an extended example. We then suggest a framework to help think about the conditions 
under which the most policy-relevant information comes from a mechanism experiment, 





II.  POLICY EXPERIMENTS AND EXTERNAL VALIDITY 
Policymaking is inevitably about prediction. What is the effect of some familiar 
policy when implemented in the future, or in some new setting? What is the effect of 
some entirely new policy? A useful way to think about the types of research activities 
that help answer these questions comes from Wolpin (2007) and Todd and Wolpin 
(2008). They distinguish between ex post policy evaluation – understanding what 
happened as the result of a policy or program that was actually implemented – and ex 
ante policy evaluation, which DiNardo and Lee (2010, p. 2) describe as beginning “with 
an explicit understanding that the program that was actually run may not be the one that 
corresponds to a particular policy of interest. Here, the goal is not descriptive, but instead 
predictive. What would be the impact if we expanded eligibility of the program? What 
would the effects of a similar program be if it were run at a national (as opposed to a 
local) level? Or if it were run today (as opposed to 20 years ago)? It is essentially a 
problem of forecasting or extrapolating, with the goal of achieving a high degree of 
external validity.” 
The challenge in making policy forecasts from ex post evaluations stems from the 
possibility that treatments may interact with characteristics of the policy’s setting – 
including the target population, time period, or other contextual factors. The effects of 
broken windows policing in Evanston, an affluent North Shore suburb of Chicago, may 
differ from the policy’s effects when implemented in distressed neighborhoods on the 
south side of Chicago. Those features of a policy’s setting (or of the policy itself) that 
may influence the policy’s impacts are what the research literature outside of economics 





this challenge and informing policy forecasts depends on what researchers believe they 
know about a policy’s mechanisms, which non-economists sometimes also call 
mediators. 
  At one extreme are situations in which researchers do not know very much about 
a policy’s candidate mechanisms -- the list of plausible mechanisms might be 
overwhelmingly long, or we might have little sense for whether the mechanisms 
potentially interact or even work at cross purposes, or what (if any) aspects of the 
relevant causal chain operate in ways that are invariant across policy settings. The 
standard approach has been to carry out policy evaluations in as many settings as possible 
of the sort in which the policy might actually be implemented. As Cook and Campbell 
(1979) note, “tests of the extent to which one can generalize across various kinds of 
persons, settings and times are, in essence, tests of statistical interactions… In the last 
analysis, external validity … is a matter of replication” (p. 73, 78). Angrist and Pischke 
(2010, p. 23-24) argue “a constructive response to the specificity of a given research 
design is to look for more evidence, so that a more general picture begins to emerge … 
the process of accumulating empirical evidence is rarely sexy in the unfolding, but 
accumulation is the necessary road along which results become more general.” 
  As mentioned above, there is an active debate within the economics profession 
about the value of this type of research program, focused largely on issues of external 
validity. Under this approach we forecast a policy’s effects in some setting using previous 
tests of the policy in similar settings – that is, we try to match on the policy’s candidate 
moderators (see, for example, Hotz, Imbens and Mortimer, 2005, Cole and Stuart, 2010, 





policy’s mechanisms, how do we decide which aspects of the policy or its setting is a 
potentially important moderator? Another challenge comes from the fact that policy 
evaluations are costly, and so we will never be able to carry out evaluations of ever 
candidate policy of interest in every potentially relevant setting. We have nothing new to 
add to this debate, which we view as largely orthogonal to the main argument we advance 
in this paper. 
The type of situation to which our paper is relevant arises when researchers have 
some beliefs about the mechanisms through which a policy influences social welfare. 
One way researchers currently use such beliefs is by interpreting the results of 
randomized experiments through the lens of a particular structural model (Wolpin, 2007; 
Todd and Wolpin, 2008; Heckman, 2010; Imbens, 2010). This approach takes the policy 
experiment that is run as given, imposes some assumptions after the fact about the 
policy’s mechanisms, fits the model, then forecasts the effects of a wide range of policies 
and settings. This approach can make sense when we have sufficiently sharp prior beliefs 
about the way the world works to be confident that we have the right structural model, 
and that the key structural parameters really are structural (that is, invariant across 
settings). The structural model substitutes assumptions for data, traded off against the risk 
that our assumptions are incorrect. 
But if we believe we know something about the mechanisms through which the 
policy might operate, why limit ourselves to using this information only after a policy 
evaluation has been designed and carried out? Why not use this information to help 
inform the design of the experiment that is being run? Why not design experiments that 





shifts to identifying mechanisms, the importance of having close (or even any) 
correspondence between the interventions we test and the specific policy applications we 
seek to inform is diminished. The change that this way of thinking implies for the design 
of our policy experiments is not just cosmetic. The change can be drastic, as we illustrate 
in the next section.
2 
Mechanism experiments can help with the policy forecasting or external validity 
problem in two ways. First, improved understanding of a policy’s mechanisms can help 
us predict what aspects of the policy or its setting may moderate the policy’s impacts. 
Second, by taking advantage of what researchers believe they already know mechanism 
experiments can be less costly than policy evaluations. This means that we can carry out 
relatively more mechanism experiments in different settings, and help prioritize the types 
of policies and settings in which we should carry out full-scale policy evaluations. 
 
III. MECHANISM EXPERIMENTS 
In what follows we illustrate some of the ways in which mechanism experiments 
can help generate policy-relevant information. We use the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) 
residential-mobility experiment as an extended example. As context for this example, we 
note that economists have become increasingly interested in the role of social interactions 
in affecting people’s choices and behavioral outcomes (Becker and Murphy, 2000; 
Manski, 2000). Housing policy affects the social interactions that people experience (as 
well as the quality of their local public goods) by affecting the geographic concentration 
of poverty in America. 
                                                 
2 Another relevant observation here is that if we really believe that the key structural parameters in our 
model are structural, then there is no intrinsic reason that we would need to test a real policy to identify 





To learn about the effects of concentrated neighborhood poverty on poor families, 
in the early 1990s the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development launched the 
MTO demonstration. Since 1994, MTO has enrolled around 4,600 low-income public 
housing families with children and randomly assigned them into three groups: 1) a 
traditional voucher group, which received a standard housing voucher that subsidizes 
them to live in private-market housing; 2) a low-poverty voucher group that received a 
standard housing voucher that is similar to what was received by the traditional voucher 
group, with the exception that the voucher could only be redeemed in Census tracts with 
1990 poverty rates below 10 percent; and 3) a control group, which received no 
additional services. 
Assignment to the low-poverty voucher group led to more sizable changes in 
neighborhood poverty and other neighborhood characteristics than did assignment to the 
traditional voucher group (Ludwig et al., 2008). The traditional voucher treatment did not 
have many detectable impacts on the outcomes of MTO parents or children 4-7 years 
after baseline (Kling, Ludwig and Katz, 2005, Sanbonmatsu et al., 2006, and Kling, 
Liebman and Katz, 2007, Fortson and Sanbonmatsu, 2010). The low-poverty voucher 
treatment generated a more complicated pattern of impacts. The low-poverty voucher did 
not affect children’s schooling outcomes, perhaps because MTO moves wound up 
generating only modest changes in school quality, but did cause sizable reductions in 
youth violence. The low-poverty voucher had effects on other youth behaviors that 
differed by gender, with girls doing better and boys doing worse as a result of the moves 
(Clampet-Lundquist et al., 2011). For adults, the low-poverty voucher treatment did not 





important effects on mental health and some physical health outcomes, including 
obesity.
3 
Two of us (Kling and Ludwig) have worked on MTO for many years, and have 
often heard the reaction that the traditional voucher treatment is more policy-relevant and 
interesting than the low-poverty voucher treatment, because only the former corresponds 
to a realistic policy option. But it was the low-poverty voucher that generated a 
sufficiently large “treatment dose” to enable researchers to learn that something about 
neighborhood environments can matter for important outcomes like adult obesity, a fact 
that would not have been discovered if MTO’s design had only included the more 
realistic traditional voucher treatment. For this reason, findings from the low poverty 
voucher have been very influential in housing policy circles. 
To illustrate the different ways in which mechanism experiments might be useful 
for policy, we focus on one of the key findings from MTO —the reduction in adult 
obesity. Imagine New York City policymakers were interested in reducing the prevalence 
of obesity, which contributes to health problems like diabetes and heart disease. One 
pattern in the epidemiological data that would immediately be obvious to policy planners 
would be the large disparities in obesity prevalence across neighborhoods. Data from 
2003-7 show that the share of adults who are obese ranges from 8 percent on the Upper 
East Side to 30 percent in the directly adjacent neighborhood of East Harlem (Black and 
Macinko, 2010). 
These patterns would presumably lead policymakers to think about the 
“production function” that produces obesity, in the spirit of Sen et al. (2009). Of course 
                                                 
3 The public health community officially defines obesity as having a body mass index, which is weight in 
kilograms divided by height in meters squared, or BMI = kg/m





the prevalence of obesity is a function of calories consumed and time spent in energetic 
activity, but also of other factors that interact with diet and physical activity, and that 
vary across neighborhoods. For example, some neighborhoods may be “food deserts” that 
have few grocery stores that sell fresh fruits and vegetables, which might lead people to 
eat higher-calorie, less healthy foods (Wehunt, 2009). Some neighborhoods may have 
few parks or places to exercise. Neighborhood conditions might also affect levels of 
psychosocial stress, which in turn can affect diet and exercise. 
Depending on our prior beliefs about certain aspects of the framework discussed 
above, mechanism experiments could be useful for guiding policy in this area by helping 
us: 1) rule out candidate policies; 2) expand the set of policy options for which we can 
forecast effects; 3) prioritize available research funding; 4) concentrate resources on 
estimating parameters about which we have the most uncertainty or disagreement; and 5) 
strengthen causal inference with either randomized or “natural” experiments. 
 
1. Ruling out policies 
Twenty-five years ago the distinguished sociologist Peter H. Rossi (1987, p. 4) 
considered the discouraging results of the policy-evaluation literature of the 1970s and 
1980s and formulated his Iron Law of Evaluation: “the expected value of any net impact 
assessment of any large scale social program is zero.”
4 This pessimistic assessment is 
presumably motivated by the difficulty of consistently implementing social programs 
well, and by our limited understanding about what combination of mechanisms is most 
                                                 
4 Rossi’s Stainless Steel Law of Evaluation holds that “the better designed the impact assessment of a social 
program, the more likely is the resulting estimate of net impact to be zero.”  Rossi’s Zinc Law of 






important for improving people’s life chances. Sometimes mechanism experiments can 
be used to provide an initial indication of whether Rossi’s law holds in a given context, 
and to do so at reduced cost compared to carrying out a series of full-scale policy 
evaluations. 
  For example, policymakers concerned that distressed neighborhoods may be 
“food deserts” might consider a policy of subsidizing grocery stores to locate into such 
areas as a way to reduce obesity. Carrying out a policy evaluation of location incentives 
for grocery stores would be expensive because the unit of randomization is the 
community, the cost per community is high, and the number of communities needed to 
have adequate statistical power is large. 
Now consider the following mechanism experiment that could be carried out 
instead: Enroll a sample of low-income families, and randomly assign some of them to 
receive free weekly delivery of fresh fruits and vegetables to their homes. By using 
individuals as the unit of randomization, rather than communities, this mechanism 
experiment would be much less expensive than the more “realistic” policy evaluation. 
Randomizing people rather than neighborhoods also lets us test a “treatment dose” that is 
much more intensive than what could be obtained with any realistic policy intervention. 
Imagine we found that several hundreds of dollars’ worth of free fruits and 
vegetables delivered to someone’s door each month had no effect on obesity. Suppose we 
also believed eating habits adapt rapidly to changes in food availability, that social 
interactions are not very important in shaping eating habits, and that reducing the price of 
accessing fruits and vegetables never reduces the chances of eating them (that is, there is 





case null results from our mechanism experiment would lead us to predict that any sort of 
policy that tried to address the “food desert” problem would (on its own) be unlikely to 
diminish the obesity problem. 
  If we had more uncertainty about the role of social interactions or time in 
affecting eating habits, then different mechanism-experiment designs would be required. 
If we believed that social interactions might be important determinants of people’s eating 
habits, then we would need a more costly experiment with three randomized arms, not 
just two – a control group, a treatment arm that received free food delivery for 
themselves, and a treatment arm that received food delivery for themselves and for a 
limited number of other households that the family designated (“buddy deliveries”).
5 If 
we thought that eating habits were determined at a still larger macro-level, we would 
have to randomly assign entire communities to receive free home food delivery. A 
community-level test of home fruit and vegetable delivery could still wind up being less 
expensive than a policy evaluation of incentive locations for grocery stores, because of 
the large guarantees that would be required to entice a grocery store to incur the start-up 
costs of establishing a new location in a neighborhood. But if we thought that eating 
habits changed very slowly over time, and at the community level, then we would have to 
commit to providing home food delivery for entire communities for extended periods of 
time – at which point there might be little cost advantage compared to a policy evaluation 
of grocery-store subsidies. 
                                                 
5 Duflo and Saez (2003) discuss a cleverly designed experiment that used individuals as the unit of analysis 
but was designed to identify spillover effects. In their experiment, some people in some departments within 
a company received incentives to visit a benefit fair to learn more about savings plans. They assessed both 
direct effects of the information, and effects of information spillovers (from comparisons of the outcomes 
of the non-incentivized individuals in incentivized departments to individuals in non-incentivized 
departments). The information diffused through the experiment had a noticeable impact on plan 





  The possibility of using a mechanism experiment to learn more about “food 
deserts” is not an isolated example. Consider that the 2010 health care legislation 
included $9.5 billion in funding over five years to double the number of people served by 
local community health centers. Expanding community health care centers could 
potentially reduce total health care spending by improving access to regular preventive 
health care services, thereby reducing the need for emergency care (National Association 
of Community Health Centers. 2010). However, this hypothesis has not been subject to 
any sort of rigorous empirical test that we know of, because it is hard to imagine running 
a large-scale experiment that randomly assigned areas to get community health care 
centers. But we could run a mechanism experiment that randomly assigned individual 
low-income families in medically under-served neighborhoods to receive improved 
access to routine, preventive health care using a van that pulled right up in front of their 
home. Indeed, this was the same basic idea behind the Washington, D.C. Mobile Unit for 
Child Health Care experiment that was run 45 years ago (Gutelius et al., 1977). 
As a final (non-health) example, consider the question of whether smaller high 
schools improve student achievement. Possible mechanisms through which this might 
occur include stronger relationships between students and school staff, having students 
spend more time around peers who share their interests, and providing school 
administrators with more autonomy (Bloom et al., 2010). Instead of immediately carrying 
out a full-scale, very costly policy evaluation of small schools, why not first carry out a 
mechanism experiment focused on bonding instead? Take a representative sample of 
charter schools, which already provide administrators with autonomy. Randomly assign 





weekends with small, randomly-selected groups of students in an effort to promote 
faculty-student and student-to-student bonding. Evidence that this intervention was 
capable of promoting student engagement and academic outcomes would suggest the 
value of carrying out a large-scale policy evaluation. But evidence that even what H.L. 
Mencken (1948) would call a “horse-doctor’s dose” of extra bonding did not affect 
student outcomes would greatly reduce the motivation to carry out a large-scale policy 
evaluation of smaller schools. 
 
2. Expand the set of policies and settings for which we can forecast policy impacts. 
  Ruling out entire classes of policy interventions is easier when our experiments 
test interventions that are as intensive (or more) as anything that could be accomplished 
by actual policies. Testing unrealistically intensive treatment arms also has the benefit of 
letting us forecast the effects of a wide range of more realistic policy options in those 
cases when, in spite of Rossi’s Iron Law, our policy experiments do identify successful 
interventions. As Hausman and Wise (1985, p. 194-5) noted a quarter-century ago: “If, 
for policy purposes, it is desirable to estimate the effects of possible programs not 
described by treatments, then interpolations can be made between estimated treatment 
effects. If the experimental treatments are at the bounds of possible programs, then of 
course this calculation is easier.” 
The policy impact that this type of study can have is illustrated by the RAND 
Health Insurance Experiment, which included many treatment arms that do not 
correspond to any sort of health insurance policy one could buy today (Newhouse et al., 





generosity of health insurance plans affects the demand for health care and subsequent 
health outcomes. With a total cost of $285 million in 2010 dollars, the RAND experiment 
also holds the record – for now – as the most expensive mechanism experiment of all 
time (Greenberg and Shroder, 2004, p. 181). 
 
3. Prioritize research funding 
  If a mechanism experiment tested the most intensive imaginable intervention to 
address the problem of “food deserts” and found no effect on obesity, we would rule out 
not only the value of policies to address food deserts but also, obviously, the value of 
policy evaluations to test those types of policies. Null results from a policy evaluation of 
a more realistic but less-intensive intervention would not let us shut down an entire line 
of research inquiry in the same way, since it would always be possible to imagine that a 
slightly more intensive intervention might yield more promising results. 
  Encouraging results from a mechanism experiment would help us decide where to 
invest additional research funding, and might also help shape the types of policies that we 
subjected to full-scale policy evaluations. Suppose, for example, we found that delivering 
hundreds of dollars worth of free fruit and vegetables to the doorsteps of low-income 
families each month only changed the consumption of, say, apples. This finding might 
lead policymakers to conclude that the right policy to evaluate is not just a costly effort to 
incentivize new grocery stores to move into high-poverty areas, but also (or perhaps 
instead) a lower-cost program to subsidize bodegas and convenience stores just enough to 
make it profitable for them to stock this one type of fruit. 





4. Concentrate resources on estimating parameters about which we are most uncertain.  
  In the introduction we noted that mechanism experiments can help us concentrate 
resources on estimating parameters about which we have the most uncertainty or 
disagreement. As another example along these lines, suppose policymakers are concerned 
about the secondary consequences of psychosocial stress on poor families, including 
health impacts. For families in poor urban areas, one of the most important sources of 
stress is crime – particularly gun crime (Cook and Ludwig, 2000; Kling, Liebman and 
Katz, 2005; Kling, Ludwig and Katz, 2005). Policymakers could sponsor a full-scale 
evaluation of targeted police patrols against illegal guns in high-crime areas, then test the 
impacts on obesity and other health outcomes. But previous work already tells us 
something about this intervention’s effects on crime (Cohen and Ludwig, 2003), and 
perhaps also about the effect of crime on stress (Buka et al., 2001). The new information 
from this experiment is primarily about the stress→obesity link. But for a given budget 
we could learn more about the stress→obesity pathway (and how that might vary across 
settings) by carrying out a mechanism experiment that enrolled residents of high-crime 
areas and assigned some to a meditation-based stress-reduction program (Kabat-Zinn et 
al., 1992). 
In other situations we might be most uncertain about the link between our policy 
levers and key mediating mechanisms (P→M). For example, in the case of obesity we 
already understand the connection of body mass with diet and exercise (Cutler, Glaeser, 
and Shapiro, 2003). But we might not understand the effects of our policies on diet and 
exercise. In situations like this, diet and exercise become what medical researchers call 





our experiments. The idea of focusing selectively on testing individual links in a causal 
chain also raises the possibility of using mechanism experiments to compress the 
timetable required to learn about the long-term effects of some policy, by testing different 
sequential links in a causal chain simultaneously. 
Perhaps less obvious is the value of carrying out multiple experiments that use 
different policy levers to manipulate the same mechanism, given the great difficulty of 
determining what is the true mediating mechanism that links a policy to an outcome, 
rather than just a proxy for the mediating variable that really matters.
6 Showing that the 
effects of reduced stress on obesity is the same regardless of whether stress levels are 
modified through a meditation program or by some sort of anti-gun policing program 
would be informative about whether the mediating mechanism of stress is “non-
implementation specific,” to use John DiNardo’s term, or what Heckman (2010) calls 
“policy invariant.” 
  A final non-health example about the ability of mechanism experiments to focus 
research resources comes from the possibility of avoiding the need to carry out full-
blown “synergy” (or “kitchen sink”) experiments of the sort that the federal government 
regularly sponsors, like Jobs Plus. This experiment tested the combined effects of 
providing public housing residents with financial incentives for work (relief from the 
“HUD tax” on earnings that comes from setting rent contributions as a fixed share of 
income), employment and training services, and efforts to improve “community support 
for work.” Previous studies have already examined the effects of the first two program 
                                                 
6 Some simple notation suggested to us by Steve Pischke helps illustrate the problem. Let P be the policy, 
M be the mediator, Y be the outcome (with P→M→Y as in Figure 1), with M=U+V, cov(U,V)=0, 
cov(U,Y)=0, and cov(V,Y)>0. That is, only the V part of M is causally related to Y. In population data we 
see cov(M,Y)>0. In this example, M is an implementation specific mediator because policies that change 





ingredients when administered independently, while the potential value of community 
support for work is suggested by the Wilson (1987, 1996) among others. The key 
program theory of Jobs Plus is that these three mechanisms interact, and so have more-
than-additive effects on labor market outcomes (Bloom, Riccio and Verma, 2005). 
Across six cities, Jobs Plus randomly assigned entire housing projects to either a control 
group, or a program group in which residents received the bundle of Jobs Plus services. 
  We could have instead carried out a mechanism experiment that enrolled a 
slightly less disadvantaged (and hence slightly less directly policy-relevant) study sample 
that needed one or two but not all three of the mechanisms the Jobs Plus theory suggests 
are needed for labor market success. Imagine enrolling people who applied for means-
tested housing assistance, which in some cities is rationed using randomized lotteries 
(Jacob and Ludwig, 2011), and are already living in neighborhoods with high 
employment rates. Then we randomly assign some of them to receive employment and 
training services. A test of the Jobs Plus “synergy” theory comes from comparing the 
response to these services for those who were versus were not lucky enough to be 
randomly assigned a housing subsidy. Our proposed mechanism experiment conserves 
resources by reducing the dimensionality of the experimental intervention. 
 
5. Help strengthen causal inference 
  Mechanism experiments can help us interpret the results of policy evaluations, 
including null findings. Once we know that some mechanism is linked to an outcome, the 
first thing we would check upon seeing a zero impact in a full-scale policy evaluation is 





unchanged would suggest the potential value of testing other policies that might generate 
larger changes in the mediator. Without the mechanism experiment, we wouldn’t be sure 
whether it would be worth following up a null impact from a policy evaluation with more 
research in that area. 
  Mechanism experiments can also strengthen the basis for causal inference with 
“natural experiment” policy evaluations. Imagine a simple pre-post study of aggregate 
U.S.-level data of a change in Medicaid policies that reduced out-of-pocket costs to poor 
adults from having, say, bariatric surgery, in which part of someone’s stomach is 
removed or reduced in size by a gastric band in order to reduce appetite and food 
consumption. Suppose the study found that after the policy change, bariatric surgery rates 
among low-income people increase and obesity rates decline. Absent any additional 
information, this study design would not provide compelling evidence about the link 
between bariatric surgery and obesity, given the large number of other factors that are 
changing over time that influence obesity. But there would seem to be far fewer 
confounding threats to estimating the effect of the policy on bariatric surgery rates (the 
P→Y link) from a simple pre-post comparison. Additional evidence about the mechanism 
(the M→Y link between bariatric surgery and obesity) would enable us to infer how 
much of the time trend in obesity prevalence was due to the Medicaid policy change. 
Evidence for the mechanism-outcome link here happens to come from a medical trial 
rather than an experimental test of an unrealistic policy, but the example nonetheless 
highlights our key point. 
  New mechanism experiments could even be designed with the explicit goal of 





of compulsory schooling laws document the causal relationship of educational attainment 
with earnings, crime, health, and other outcomes (Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2009). Less 
well understood are the mechanisms behind this relationship. Is it that schooling affects 
academic skills? Or specific vocational skills? Or social-cognitive skills? The answer is 
relevant for thinking about how we should deploy the $485 billion the U.S. spends each 
year on K-12 public schooling (U.S. Census Bureau. 2011, Table 258). Why not spend a 
few million dollars on a mechanism experiment that assigns youth to curricula or 
supplemental activities that emphasize different specific skills, to better understand the 
mechanisms behind the effects of compulsory schooling laws? 
 
IV. WHEN CAN MECHANISM EXPERIMENTS BE USEFUL?   
  The purpose of our paper is not to argue that economists should only carry out 
mechanism experiments, or that mechanism experiments are “better” than policy 
evaluations. Our main point is that given the current paucity of mechanism experiments 
designed to help answer policy questions, on the margin we think that economists should 
be doing more of them.  
Table 1 presents a framework for thinking about the conditions under which 
mechanism experiments can help inform policy decisions. Under a very particular set of 
conditions, mechanism experiments may by themselves be sufficient to guide policy 
decisions. More common are likely to be scenarios in which mechanism experiments and 
traditional policy evaluations (which could include “natural” as well as randomized 





might not even be that helpful, and a more useful approach would be to just go right to 
running a black-box policy evaluation. 
 
1.  When Mechanism Experiments Can Be Helpful 
In order for a mechanism experiment to make any sense at all, we need to believe 
that we know at least something about the candidate mechanisms through which a policy 
might affect the outcomes of ultimate policy concern (the right-hand column of Table 1). 
Under some circumstances mechanism experiments might be sufficient to guide 
policy design. We need to believe that the list of candidate mechanisms through which a 
policy might affect outcomes is fairly short, or that the long list of potentially relevant 
mechanisms do not interact or work at cross purposes (a short list of candidate 
mechanisms that could interact would not by itself preclude a mechanism experiment). 
Depending on the application we might need to know something already about other 
parts of the causal chain. At the very least we would need to be confident that existing 
systems are capable of reliably delivering the policies that activate key mechanisms. 
Even then, if the cost of carrying out a policy evaluation were low enough relative to the 
policy stakes, we would probably still wish to carry out a policy evaluation to improve 
our policy forecast. We would settle for just a mechanism experiment if the costs of 
carrying out a policy evaluation were prohibitive, or the policy stakes were low. 
 
2.  Do Mechanism Experiments plus Policy Evaluations 
  One reason it would make sense to follow a mechanism experiment that had 





other parts of the causal chain, such as when there is implementation uncertainty. For 
example, medical researchers distinguish between “efficacy trials,” which are small-scale 
research trials of model programs carried out with high fidelity, and “effectiveness trials” 
that test the effects of some intervention carried out under field conditions at scale. 
Efficacy trials can be thought of as a type of mechanism experiment, since having a 
bespectacled, laptop-toting professor loom over the program’s implementation is not 
usually standard operating procedure. Compared to efficacy trials, larger-scale 
effectiveness trials often have more program attrition, weaker training for service 
providers, weaker implementation monitoring, and smaller impacts (Lipsey et al., 2007).  
  As noted above, prior evidence from mechanism experiments can enhance the 
efficiency of our portfolio of policy evaluations by helping us figure out which 
evaluations are worth running. This includes carrying out mechanism experiments in 
different settings to determine in where it is worth trying a policy evaluation. 
Learning about the mechanisms through which a policy affects outcomes can also 
help predict which aspects of the policy or its settings will moderate the policy’s impacts, 
although it is worth keeping in mind that the correspondence between mechanisms and 
moderators is far from perfect. For example, the well-known Tennessee STAR 
experiment found that reducing class sizes in elementary school improved learning 
outcomes (Krueger, 1999; Schanzenbach, 2007). Lazear (2001) argues that a key 
mechanism for these class-size effects is the reduced chance that instructional time in a 
given classroom is diverted by disruptive students, which helps explain why in the STAR 
experiment lower-income and minority students seemed to benefit the most. But when 





average teacher quality seemed to decline, particularly in those schools serving 
disproportionately low-income and minority students (Jepsen and Rivkin, 2009). Thus, 
teacher quality turned out to be a surprise mechanism (at least to California 
policymakers). Student background wound up being a moderator that influenced different 
parts of the causal chain in different ways. 
 
3.  Do Some Combination of “Basic Science” and Policy Evaluation 
In some situations researchers do not yet know enough to narrow down the list of 
candidate mechanisms through which a policy operates, or worry that a policy’s long list 
of candidate mechanisms might interact (or if some might work at cross purposes) – 
represented by the first column of Table 1. The debate within the economics profession is 
about whether it is best under these circumstances to carry out “basic science” studies or 
to carry out policy evaluations. The extreme position is that policy evaluations can never 
be useful for policy purposes, which strikes us as unlikely to be correct.  
In the case of Moving to Opportunity, for example, observational studies going 
back to the 1920s had shown that neighborhood attributes are correlated with behavioral 
outcomes, even after controlling for individual- and family-level factors. Policymakers 
need to know whether such correlations reflect an underlying causal relationship, which 
is relevant to decisions like whether to whether to devote resources to building public 
housing or to private-market rent subsidies, or whether to allow suburban townships to 
limit zoning approval for low-cost housing. Given the large number of potentially-





well-being, it is not clear that anything short of a black-box policy evaluation would have 
much value in guiding these policy decisions. 
One common criticism of black-box policy evaluations is that we cannot 
understand the characteristics that explain heterogeneity of treatment effects (that is, a 
policy’s moderators) without understanding the policy’s key mediating mechanisms. 
While there is no question that evidence about mechanisms is tremendously valuable, we 
believe it is not correct that black-box evaluations are never useful. 
Consider the example of statins, which have been used since the late 1980s
7 and 
shown in numerous randomized clinical trials to reduce the risk of heart disease and 
overall mortality (Ross et al., 1999, Gotto, 2003). Statins were originally thought to 
prevent heart attacks by lowering cholesterol levels in the blood, which in turn reduced 
the chance of plaque build-up. But meta-analyses of black-box clinical trials showed that 
statins improved health outcomes even among people who already had relatively low 
levels of blood cholesterol at baseline (Golomb et al., 2004, Wilt et al., 2004, 
Thavendiranathan et al., 2004). Moreover, these meta-analyses showed that the 
cardiovascular benefits of statins seemed to occur too rapidly after onset of treatment to 
be explained by the effects of statins on plaque accumulation (Golomb et al., 2008). The 
leading hypothesis – at least for now – is that statins reduce heart attacks partly by 
reducing inflammation (Zhang, 2010) or blood pressure (Golomb et al., 2008).  
  The key point for present purposes is that right now we don’t really know exactly 
why statins reduce heart attacks. Yet meta-analyses of black-box clinical trial studies 
show that they clearly do improve health, and can also tell us something about how their 
effects on health are moderated by patient characteristics such as age, gender, and 
                                                 





baseline health status. Our limited understanding of the mechanisms through which 
statins work has not prevented them from becoming one of the world’s top-selling drug 
classes, to the extent that some medical experts have suggested should be “put into the 
water supply” (Golomb et al., 2004, p. 154).  
A similar point was made during Congressional testimony in 1971 by Sidney 
Farber, the “godfather of cancer research,” who argued (as quoted in Fortune, 2007): “We 
cannot wait for full understanding; the 325,000 patients with cancer who are going to die 
this year cannot wait; nor it is necessary, to make great progress in the cure of cancer, for 
us to have the full solution of all the problems of basic research… The history of 
medicine is replete with examples of cures obtained years, decades, and even centuries 
before the mechanism of action was understood for these cures – from vaccination, to 
digitalis, to aspirin.”
8  
  This is not to say that later understanding of mechanisms does not generate 
tremendous benefits to society. For example, learning more about how chemotherapy 
works has dramatically increased the benefit/cost ratio of such treatments over time. But 
evidence that an intervention works, even if we don’t understand why, is better than not 
having access to that intervention at all. Repeated black-box experiments can eventually 
help us learn something about the policy’s moderators, and, as in our statins example, can 
also inform our theorizing about candidate mechanisms as well.  
 
                                                 
8 Thanks to Harold Pollack for suggesting this quotation. At the risk of over-emphasizing the point, one 
more example comes from two of the most important mental health drug discoveries – lithium, which is 
used to treat bipolar disorder, and Thorazine, which is used to treat psychosis. Modern medicine has very 





V.  CONCLUSIONS 
It seems like common sense that the best way to use experiments to inform policy 
is to test policies. However, we argue here for increased use of randomized experiments 
that identify behavioral mechanisms that are central to clearly specified policy questions, 
even if the specific interventions that are tested (or their settings) do not correspond 
exactly to what policymakers would implement in practice. While our suggestion might 
seem obvious once articulated, mechanism experiments that are designed to help answer 
specific policy questions remain rare. We hasten to add that mechanism experiments and 
traditional policy evaluations are as a general proposition best thought of as 
complements, rather than substitutes. We need to make greater use of mechanism 
experiments, on the margin, without fetishizing mechanisms. 
The larger question of how to structure experiments to maximize the ability to 
apply the findings more generally in other contexts opens up a number of potentially 
fruitful lines of additional research beyond what we have considered here. For example, 
many people seem to have the intuition that evidence about either the link between policy 
levers and mechanisms (P→M from Figure 1) or between mechanisms and outcomes 
(M→Y) is more generalizable than evidence about the link between policies and ultimate 
outcomes of interest (P→Y). It is not hard to think of situations in which this is true, but 
this need not be true in all cases.
9 It would be useful to learn more about how the causal 
                                                 
9 Imagine a case with a single candidate mediator and outcome of interest. Whether either of the individual 
links in this causal chain (P→M or M→Y) is more stable across contexts than is the total effect of the 
policy on the outcome, P→Y, depends in part on how P→M and M→Y co-vary across contexts. It is not 
hard to imagine cases in which the two relationships negatively co-vary, so the effect of the policy on the 
outcome is more stable across situations than the link between the policy and mediator or the mediator and 
outcome. Suppose that in neighborhoods where adoption of broken windows policing leads to relatively 
larger increases in arrests for minor offenses, the stigma of arrest declines, and so the deterrent effect of the 





links from P→M and M→Y co-vary across contexts, and the extent to which those links 
reinforce each other or may tend to offset each other. 
A second line of investigation that seems worth exploring more is the benefits and 
costs of policy field experiments (both mechanism experiments and policy evaluations) 
versus “natural experiment” studies. Sometimes natural experiment studies have designs 
that are as good as random assignment of treatment because they actually involve random 
assignment (see for example, Angrist 1990, Kling, 2006, and Jacob and Ludwig, 2011). 
But more often, natural experiment studies necessarily rely on research designs that 
generate information that may be more local than that obtained from an experiment (such 
as regression discontinuity), or that may be more vulnerable to omitted variables bias. On 
the other hand, natural experiment studies circumvent the external validity concerns 
raised by either randomization bias (the self-selection of people willing to sign up for a 
randomized experiment; see Heckman, 1992 and Malani, 2006) or selection-partner bias 
(the willingness of organizations to participate in experiments; see Alcott and 
Mullainathan, 2011). But with few exceptions little is currently known about the extent of 
randomization or selection-partner bias in practice. Alternatively, policy field 
experiments and natural experiments may be complements in a broader program of 
research on an issue that involves multiple stages (Kling 2007). 
A final question worth considering is the issue of when and how to export results 
across contexts. While statistical matching of estimates obtained from similar 
interventions and contexts is fine, as far as it goes, a broader framework would let us 
incorporate behavioral models, parameters, and prior beliefs into the policy forecasting 
                                                                                                                                                 
deterred by the prospect of being arrested, policymakers respond by implementing this policing strategy in 





exercise. This type of policy forecasting, or ex ante policy evaluation, will inevitably 
require more assumptions, theory and guesswork than ex post studies of previous policies 
(see also Harrison and List, 2004, p. 1033). But policy forecasting is in the end at least as 
important for public policy. As the distinguished physicist Richard Feynman (1964) once 
argued, “The moment you make statements about a region of experience that you haven’t 
directly seen, then you must be uncertain. But we always must make statements about the 
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Policy Experiment Check-List 
 
  Prior beliefs / understanding of mechanisms 
  Low High 
Implications for 
experimental design 







Do more basic science; 
multiple methods to 
uncover mechanisms 
Run a mechanism 
experiment to rule out 





Run mechanism experiment 
to help rule in policies 
 
Either follow with full 
policy evaluation 
(depending on costs of 
policy evaluation, and 
potential program benefits / 
scale), or use results of 
mechanism experiment for 
calibration and structural 
estimation for key 
parameters for benefit-cost 
calculations. 
Implications for policy 
forecasting / external 
validity 
Run multiple policy 
evaluations; carry out 
policy forecasting by 
matching to estimates 
derived from similar 




characteristics to match on? 
Where do these come from? 
Use mechanism knowledge 
to measure characteristics 
of policy and setting 




Can run new mechanism 
experiments to test in 
different settings prior to 
carrying out policy 
evaluations in those 
settings. 
 
 